

STAT

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-2

NEW YORK TIMES
15 NOVEMBER 1982

Sandinist Renegade Says C.I.A. Hamstrings Him

By ALAN RIDING

Special to The New York Times

SAN JOSE, Costa Rica, Nov. 9 — Edén Pastora Gómez paced impatiently around his small office, digging out old documents that he said showed his political consistency, removing an AR-15 rifle that hangs in front of a map of Nicaragua to point out which Sandinist garrisons had recently deserted to join forces with him.

But the "Commander Zero" of the 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution could not hide his frustration. His war exploits had helped make him the most popular Sandinist leader, yet in July 1981 he resigned as Deputy Defense Minister and left Managua, disillusioned with the revolution.

Finally, last April, he publicly denounced the radicalism of his former colleagues and pledged to "rescue" the revolution — if necessary, by force. The mere mention of his name was banned by the Sandinists, while Nicaraguans braced themselves for some spectacular coup similar to the attack that Mr. Pastora led on the Somoza regime's National Palace in August 1978.

Yet since then, he says, he has been unable to act, caught in the crossfire of the confrontation between Washington and Managua. "The United States doesn't want any revolution and the Sandinist National Directorate wants to hold on to power at all cost," Mr. Pastora said. "Between them, they're leading the country to a disaster."

Mr. Pastora said he believes that the United States is supporting remnants of the Somoza regime's national guard operating in bands out of southern Honduras and that this support is strengthening the Sandinists.

Playing a Waiting Game

"All we ask is that the United States withdraw and allow democratic Nicaraguans to resolve things," he said. "If you removed the guard from the north, the directorate wouldn't stay in power longer than a fly on a monkey's ear. But the C.I.A. is doing what the Sandinists want; the entire country would rise up against any force that invaded under the flag of the hated guard."

In his headquarters on a quiet hillside outside San José, the 45-year-old Mr. Pastora has been forced to play a waiting game. He worries that his inaction may be eroding his popularity in Nicaragua, but he remains convinced that only he can offer a viable "third way"

that will eliminate the most radical Sandinists and keep extreme rightist counterrevolutionaries from seizing power. "I know the Sandinists have sold the image of Edén as a mad, erratic warmonger," he said. "But I'm really a politician. If I'd been the 'bang-bang' type, I'd have already gone in there and killed a bunch of people. I'm in favor of negotiating with the Sandinists. I'd go to Washington if I were invited."

But neither the Sandinists' nine-man directorate nor the Reagan Administration has taken up his offer. "They both see me as a danger," he said. "The directorate won't listen to me when I tell them that we shouldn't impose the Cuban revolution on Nicaragua. And the United States knows that my democratic anti-imperialist revolution would be imitated across the region."

A Matter of Principles

Mr. Pastora insisted that before he spoke out in public against the directorate last April, he made repeated attempts to negotiate a return to the revolution's original principles, including preservation of a mixed economy and political pluralism. The directorate, he said, ignored his proposals and undermined his efforts to help Guatemalan guerrilla groups.

Mr. Pastora therefore formed his own Sandino Revolutionary Front, made up of what he calls "authentic" Sandinists, and turned his wrath against the Nicaraguan Government. But he maintained that his efforts to build a new "liberation" army have been repeatedly blocked by the Reagan Administration.

Late in May, after a wave of desertions by Sandinist soldiers and officials threatened to turn Costa Rica into a springboard for armed incursions against the Sandinists, as it had been against the Somoza regime three years earlier, Mr. Pastora was abruptly expelled by the Costa Rican Government, which, though openly anti-Sandinist, was fearful of border clashes.

Conditions Are Rejected

Mr. Pastora then flew to Honduras for talks with the head of its armed forces, Gen. Gustavo Alvarez Martínez, who, according to Honduran military sources, has long been working with Argentine military advisers and members of the United States Central Intelligence Agency in helping exiled national

guardsmen operating from bases in southern Honduras. But Mr. Pastora said he was merely invited to join forces with the guard.

The dissident Sandinist, whose father was murdered by a guard officer and who himself fought for 18 years against the Somoza regime, rejected the conditions outright and flew to Western Europe for talks with Social Democratic party leaders in Portugal, Italy, West Germany and Spain. On his return to Honduras early in July, he said he became aware that former Somoza supporters had been organized into a new Nicaraguan Democratic Front and were now receiving extensive support from the C.I.A.

"Alvarez tried to keep me in Honduras so my presence would serve as an endorsement of the guard," he said. "I then saw their game. Columns of 'contras' penetrated Nicaragua and, when they attacked, they'd shout, 'Viva Edén!' 'Viva Zero!' People in Nicaragua became confused. The Sandinists pointed to this as proof I was a traitor. My reply to both the C.I.A. and the National Directorate was to dissolve the Sandino Revolutionary Front."

After promising not to use Costa Rica for more than political activities, he was given a three-month residence permit. Unable to operate militarily, he formed the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance, with supporters of Alfonso Robelo Callejas, a former Nicaraguan junta member, of Brooklyn Rivera, a dissident Miskito Indian leader, and of Fernando Chamorro Rappaccioli, a long-time opponent of both the Somoza regime and its leftist successor.

Another Trip to Honduras

In the last week of October, the four flew to Honduras to make a new attempt to persuade General Alvarez to withdraw his support for the "Somocista" forces and to permit them to operate there. Mr. Pastora was reluctant to discuss the meeting beyond noting that no progress was made. "I didn't need the K.G.B. before," he explained indirectly, "and I don't need the C.I.A. now."

Well-placed sources in Honduras, however, reported that General Alvarez told them that the "war" against the Sandinists was being won without Mr. Pastora and that, if the new Revo-

CONTINUED